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Abstract
Artin’s braid groups currently provide a promising background for cryptographical applications, since the ﬁrst cryptosystems
using braids were introduced in [I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, An algebraic method for public-key cryptography, Math. Res.
Lett. 6 (1999) 287–291, I. Anshel, M. Anshel, B. Fisher, D. Goldfeld, New key agreement schemes in braid group cryptography,
RSA 2001, K.H. Ko, S.J. Lee, J.H. Cheon, J.W. Han, J.S. Kang, C. Park, New public-key cryptosystem using braid groups, Crypto
2000, pp. 166–184] (see also [V.M. Sidelnikov, M.A. Cherepnev, V.Y. Yashcenko, Systems of open distribution of keys on the basis
of noncommutative semigroups, Ross. Acad. Nauk Dokl. 332-5 (1993); English translation: Russian Acad. Sci. Dokl. Math. 48-2
(1194) 384–386]). A variety of key agreement protocols based on braids have been described, but few authentication or signature
schemes have been proposed so far. We introduce three authentication schemes based on braids, two of them being zero-knowledge
interactive proofs of knowledge. Then we discuss their possible implementations, involving normal forms or an alternative braid
algorithm, called handle reduction, which can achieve good efﬁciency under speciﬁc requirements.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, beginning with [22], several authors proposed to build secure cryptographical schemes using non-
commutative groups, in particular Artin’s braid groups [2,3,18,6,19], a natural idea as, on the one hand, braid groups
are more complicated than Abelian groups, but, on the other hand, they are not too complicated to be worked with.
In particular, the conjugacy problem in braid groups is algorithmically difﬁcult, and it consequently provides one-way
functions.
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we propose three authentication schemes designed for braid groups: the braid
schemes considered so far dealt with key exchange and conﬁdentiality, thus not providing means of authentication.
Secondly, we propose a new way of implementing braid operations, namely using braid words and the so-called handle
reduction algorithm. Not only is such an implementation very efﬁcient in practice, but it is also well suited for the
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schemes we shall describe, and, more generally, for all braid schemes where using unique representatives of the braids
is not necessary. At this stage, we mainly wish to draw the attention of researchers on the potentialities of that method.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state the difﬁcult problems based on braid groups that we shall
rely on. In Section 3, we describe our braid-based authentication schemes and list the security requirements to be
achieved to make them secure. In Section 4, we present different classical ways of computing with braids, and analyze
the security of the associated implementations of our protocols. In Section 5, we introduce a second, radically new
approach consisting in using non-normal braid words together with a reduction algorithm, and we discuss its efﬁciency
and security.
2. Difﬁcult braid problems
2.1. Braid groups
For n2, Artin’s braid group Bn is deﬁned to be the group with presentation
〈1, . . . , n−1; ij = ji for |i − j |2, iji = jij for |i − j | = 1〉. (2.1)
We refer the reader to any textbook about braids, for instance [8], for a geometrical interpretation of each element of
the group Bn by an n-strand braid in the usual sense: the idea is that every n-strand braid diagram can be encoded in
a word in the letters ±1i by slicing it into a concatenation of elementary diagrams with one crossing, and using i for
the diagram where the ith strand crosses over the (i + 1)st one. Then, the relations of (2.1) correspond to the notion
of ambient isotopy, as shown by Artin in [4]. Notice that, when a braid b is speciﬁed by a word in the letters ±1i , the
sum of the exponents ±1 in the word is not modiﬁed when the braid relations of (2.1) are applied. This sum, which
depends only on the braid itself, is called the exponent sum of b, and denoted by e(b).
The ﬁrst important point for our current purpose is that the braid groups are inﬁnite noncommutative groups which
are eligible for practical computations: there exist in particular efﬁcient ways of specifying a braid and of computing
with braids (see Section 4 below).
The second important point is the existence of difﬁcult braid problems for which no feasible solution is known. We
use several of them in the subsequent sections.
2.2. Conjugacy problems
One says that a braid b′ is a conjugate of a braid b if we have b′ = sbs−1 for some braid s. The conjugacy problem
is the question of algorithmically recognizing whether two given braids b, b′ are conjugate or not. This problem has
been proved to be decidable by Garside [15], but the algorithm he proposes, as well as all improvements proposed so
far [10,14], have a high cost, exponential in the length of the considered words and the number of strands.
The following related and even more difﬁcult question is used in [18]:
Conjugacy Search Problem. Assuming that the braid b′ is a conjugate of the braid b, ﬁnd a witness, i.e., ﬁnd s
satisfying b′ = sbs−1.
In the state of the art, it is considered infeasible to solve Conjugacy Search Problem for sufﬁciently large braids
[17]. More precisely, for a generic braid b, s′bs′−1 = sbs−1 is true only if the braid s−1s′ belongs to the centralizer
of the braid b. The latter depends on b, but it is known to be generically very small, namely to be generated by b and
the unique additional central braid 2n of [15]. Hence the probability for a random conjugate of b to be equal to b′ is
negligible. We will use a variant of this problem, when s lies in some subgroup of Bn.
We now introduce the
Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy Problem. Given a braid b in Bn, and the braids b′ = sbs−1 and b′′ = rbr−1, where
s and r lie in two subgroups of Bn that commute one with the other, ﬁnd the braid sb′′s−1 (=rb′r−1).
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The connection between this problem and the subgroup variant of the Conjugacy Search Problem is similar to the one
between the Difﬁe–Hellman Problem and the Discrete Log Problem. The Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy Problem
is obviously reducible to the Conjugacy Search Problem, but we assume that it is as hard. Hence checking that the
Conjugacy Search Problem is hard for b is supposed to ensure that the Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy Problem also
is.
2.3. Root extraction problems
The braid groups are torsion free, i.e., if b is a non-trivial braid, then b2, and, more generally, be for every e2 is
not trivial.
Root Problem (for exponent e). Assuming that the braid b′ is an eth power in Bn, ﬁnd an eth root of b′, i.e., ﬁnd b
satisfying be = b′.
It is proved in [23] that Root Problem is decidable (see also [21]), but the only known algorithm consists in explicitly
enumerating several conjugacy classes related with the initial braid b′, a process which is exponential in essence, and
therefore infeasible when braids of a sufﬁcient size are considered. In practice, Root Problem appears as even more
difﬁcult than Conjugacy Search Problem.
3. Three authentication schemes
We now present several public-key authentication schemes (also called identiﬁcation protocols), i.e., systems designed
to authenticate an entity. Scheme I is a two-pass scheme and is perfectly honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge. The other two
schemes are iterated three-pass protocols, and they are zero-knowledge in a theoretical inﬁnite framework.
In the version described below, the schemes enable B(ob) to check that A(lice) knows the secret key. The schemes
meet necessary security compliance: they ensure the conﬁdentiality of the private key, and the probability of ﬁnding
another key that will behave like the private one is negligible. The level of security of the schemes can be parameterized
by modifying the size of the braid speciﬁers in use, in particular, the braid index n.
3.1. Scheme I
In [18], a key agreement scheme is proposed, which is the braid group version of the Difﬁe–Hellman key agreement
protocol. This enables the authors of [18] to construct a public-key cryptosystem, by (in essence) carrying out the key
agreement scheme in order to calculate a common secret key, and subsequently Exclusive-Oring a hashed image (i.e.,
an image by a so-called ideal hash function) of this key with the message to conceal.
But Difﬁe–Hellman-based key agreement schemes also allow to construct two-pass (or “challenge-response”) au-
thentication schemes by (again in essence) carrying out the key agreement scheme, and verifying that the secret key
computed at the two ends (or rather a one-way/hashed image of this secret key, in order to thwart active attacks) is
actually the same. Our Scheme I is related to this approach.
Note that there is also a standard way to turn any encryption scheme into an authentication scheme, which consists
in sending to Alice both an encrypted version and a hashed image of the same message m, then requesting her to reply
with the deciphered message m (she will do it only if the hashed image of the deciphered message is the same as the one
sent by Bob). Transforming that way the cryptosystem from [18] is possible but leads to a slightly more complicated
protocol, also less ﬂexible in terms of implementation since a normal form (see Section 4) is required.
Scheme I is based on the difﬁculty of Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy Problem. It uses the trick of [18] that braids
involving disjoint families of strands commute. The data consist of a public key, which is a pair of braids, and of A’s
private key, also a braid.
We assume that n is even, and denote by LBn (resp. UBn) the subgroup of Bn generated by 1, . . . , n/2−1, i.e.,
braids where the n/2 lower strands only are braided (resp. in the subgroup generated by n/2+1, . . . , n−1). The point
is that every element in LBn commutes with every element in UBn, and alternative subgroups with this property could
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be used instead. We assume that H is a ﬁxed collision-free hash function from braids to sequences of 0’s and 1’s or,
possibly, to braids (see Appendix C).
• Phase 1. Key generation
◦ (i) Choose a public braid b in Bn such that the Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy Problem for b is hard enough.
◦ (ii) A(lice) chooses a secret braid s in LBn, her private key; she publishes b′ = sbs−1; the pair (b, b′) is the
public key.
• Phase 2. Authentication phase
◦ (i) B(ob) chooses a braid r in UBn, and sends the challenge x = rbr−1 to A.
◦ (ii) A sends the response y = H(sxs−1) to B, and B checks y = H(rb′r−1).
The following proposition states the security of our scheme, in particular, regarding the observation of the commu-
nication by a third party.
Proposition 3.1. Scheme I is a perfectly honest-veriﬁer ZK interactive proof of knowledge of s.
Proof (sketch). Completeness. Assume that, at Step 2(ii), Alice sent y′. Then Bob accepts Alice’s key if and only if we
have y′ = H(rb′r−1). The latter relation is equivalent to
y′ = H(r(sbs−1)r−1). (3.1)
By hypothesis, the braid s lies in LBn while r lies in UBn, so rs=sr holds and (3.1) is equivalent to y′=H(s(rbr−1)s−1),
i.e., to y′ = y.
Soundness. Assume a cheater A′ is accepted with non-negligible probability. This means that A′ can compute
H(rb′r−1) with non-negligible probability. As H is supposed to be an ideal hash-function, this means that A′ can
compute a braid z satisfying H(z) = H(rb′r−1) with non-negligible probability. There are two possibilities: either
we have z = rb′r−1, which contradicts the hypothesis that the Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy Problem for b is hard,
or z = rb′r−1, which means that A′ and B are able to ﬁnd a collision for H, contradicting the hypothesis that H is
collision-free.
Honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge. Consider the probabilistic Turing machine deﬁned as follows: it chooses random
braids r using the same drawing as the honest veriﬁer, and outputs the instances (r,H(rb′r−1)). Then, the instances
generated by this simulator follow the same probability distribution as the ones generated by the interactive pair (A, B).
For active attacks, the security is ensured by the hash function H: if H is one-way, these attacks are ineffective. We
discuss possible choices for H in Appendix C.
3.2. Scheme II
We describe now two authentication schemes belonging to the family of zero-knowledge schemes[12,16]; they
consist in repeating a three-pass process several times so as to guarantee the required level of security. The ﬁrst of
these schemes is based only on the difﬁculty of the Conjugacy Search Problem, thus avoiding existing attacks against
the variants of the Conjugacy Search Problem, namely against the Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy Problem and the
Multiple Conjugacy Problem [3].
• Phase 1. Key generation (as in Scheme I):
◦ (i) Choose a public braid b in Bn, so that the Conjugacy Search Problem for b is hard.
◦ (ii) A(lice) chooses a secret braid s in Bn, her private key; she publishes b′ = sbs−1; the pair (b, b′) is the
public key.
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• Phase 2. Authentication phase: Repeat the following exchanges k times, with k a polynomial function of the size
of the braid speciﬁers:
◦ (i) A chooses a random braid r , and sends x = rbr−1 to B(ob).
◦ (ii) B sends a random bit  to A.
◦ (iii) For = 0, A sends y = r to B, and B checks x = yby−1.
◦ (iii′) For = 1, A sends y = rs−1 to B, and B checks x = yb′y−1.
Remark 3.2. Scheme II can be used without change when the braid group Bn is replaced with another (ﬁnite or inﬁnite)
non-commutative group G in which the conjugacy search problem is difﬁcult.
In the general framework of a group G—so, in particular, in the case of Bn—we have the natural notion of a
right-invariant probability measure, namely a measure P satisfying P(A) = P({xa; x ∈ A}) for each a in G.
Proposition 3.3. Let G be a group where the Conjugacy Search Problem is difﬁcult. Then, Scheme II in G is a zero-
knowledge interactive proof of knowledge of s whenever the probability distribution of r at Step 2(i) is right-invariant.
Proof (sketch). —Completeness: In Step 2(iii), we have x = rbr−1, i.e., x = yby−1. In Step 2(iii′), using y = rs−1
and b′ = sbs−1, we ﬁnd
x = rbr−1 = (rs−1)(sbs−1)(rs−1)−1 = yb′y−1.
Hence Bob accepts a correct answer at each repetition, so he accepts Alice’s proof of identity with
probability 1.
—Soundness: We follow the soundness proof in [12]. Suppose that an entity A′ is authenticated with non-negligible
probability, and consider the truncated execution tree of (A′, B). At each vertex, B may ask two questions. A heavy
vertex is deﬁned as a vertex with two sons. This means that at this vertex, A′ has computed y and y′ satisfying
yby−1 = y′b′y′−1. This implies y′−1yby−1y′ = b′, which gives a solution to the Conjugacy Search Problem for b′ and
b. Indeed, the braid y′−1y enables the impersonation of Alice in any execution of the scheme, as it behaves like s. As
1
2k is assumed to be negligible, the rest of the argument is as in [12]: as the proof of A′ is accepted with non-negligible
probability, some level of the tree has at least half of its vertices having two sons, i.e., being heavy, thus yielding a
polynomial algorithm that ﬁnds a heavy vertex. Hence, from the knowledge of A′ one can extract in polynomial time
a braid behaving like the private key of Alice, so Scheme II is sound.
—Zero-knowledge: We consider the following probabilistic Turing machine M:
◦ Step 1: M randomly selects a bit ε and a braid y.
◦ Step 2: For ε = 0, M computes x = yby−1; for ε = 1, it computes x = yb′y−1.
◦ Step 3: M initiates a protocol with B, sends x to B; B replies with the bit ε′.
◦ Step 4: For ε = ε′, M outputs the triple (x, ε, y), otherwise it resets to Step 1.
Since the probability distribution of r in the authentication protocol is assumed to be right-invariant, we obtain the
same probability distribution for the y’s generated by M as for Alice’s ones. Moreover, since in case ε = 1 we have
x = ysbs−1y−1, i.e., x = (ys)b(ys)−1, using the same assumption, we obtain the same probability distribution for
the x’s arising for ε = 0 and those arising for ε = 1. As a consequence, B cannot distinguish the two cases, and the
probability to have ε = ε′ is equal to 12 . This implies that the computation cost of the machine M will be in average 2k
operations, and, therefore, that M is a polynomial time machine provided that k itself is polynomial in the size of the
initial data. 
3.3. Scheme III
Our last scheme is similar to Scheme II, but it involves the Root Problem together with the Conjugacy Search
Problem; more precisely, we use Conjugacy Search Problem and Root Problem for the same braid used as a private
key. Here we give the description for exponent e = 2; other cases e = 3, etc. are similar.
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• Phase 1. Key generation:
◦ A(lice) chooses a secret braid s in Bn and computes b = s2, so that the Conjugacy Search Problem for s and
b, and the Root Problem for b are difﬁcult; public key is b, private key is s.
• Phase 2. Authentication phase: Repeat the following exchanges k times:
◦ (i) A chooses a random braid r , and sends x = rbr−1 to B(ob).
◦ (ii) B sends a random bit  to A.
◦ (iii) For = 0, A sends y = r to B; then B checks x = yby−1.
◦ (iii′) For = 1, A sends y = rsr−1 to B; then B checks x = y2.
Proposition 3.4. Scheme III is a zero-knowledge interactive proof of knowledge of s, provided an element of the
conjugacy class of the secret key is published and the probability distribution of r at Step 2(i) is right-invariant.
Proof (sketch). The completeness and soundness parts are mainly the same as for Scheme II. As for ZK-ness, we have
to show that it is possible to simulate Bob’s view of the communication with Alice. We assume that the randomization
process is uniform (i.e., right-invariant) in Bn. The accepted inputs are of the type (x, 0, y) and (x, 1, y). To generate
the instances (x, 0, y), we select a braid speciﬁer y at random and take x = yby−1. We obtain the same probability
distribution as Alice for this type.
Let us turn to instances of the form (x, 1, y).As conjugates of s will be disclosed in any case, we can assume, (almost)
without loss of generality, that a (sufﬁciently complicated) braid s′ = qsq−1 of the conjugacy class of s is published
at Phase 1. Then, in order to generate the instances (x, 1, y), we choose a speciﬁer r at random, and take y = rs′r−1
and x = y2. Then we have y = (rq)s(rq)−1 and x = (rq)s2(rq)−1 = (rq)b(rq)−1, so, as r → rq−1 is a bijection of
Bn and the probability distribution is assumed to be right-invariant, we obtain the same probability distribution as for
Alice’s messages of this type. 
4. Implementations using normal forms
In practical implementations, we have to replace the inﬁnite braid group Bn by some ﬁnite subset, and it is unclear
how a right-measure could be deﬁned on such a subset, which cannot be itself invariant under translation. So, in
such implementations, Schemes II and III do not remain zero-knowledge, as the distribution of instances generated
by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine and that of instances of the conversation between the real Alice
and Bob become distinguishable. However, we shall see here how to adapt the schemes so as to retrieve practical
indistinguishability, and to ensure that the schemes are secure.
4.1. Specifying a braid
In order to discuss the implementation of our schemes, we ﬁrst need to know how braids are represented. Several
solutions exist. In this section, we consider the most common one, which consists in choosing a normal form, i.e.,
choosing one distinguished representative for every braid; however, depending on the braid operations we consider, we
can also work with arbitrary representatives, as we shall see in Section 5 below.
Greedy normal form. When the braid group Bn is introduced as in Section 2, a braid is an equivalence class
of words with respect to the equivalence relation ≡ generated by the relations listed in (2.1). Every braid can be
speciﬁed by different braid words, but we can avoid ambiguities by resorting to a normal form, i.e., by deﬁning
distinguished words, called normal, so that each braid is represented by a unique normal word, i.e., every braid word
is equivalent to exactly one normal word. Various normal forms have been proposed in the past decades. In terms
of applications, the most interesting one seems to be the so-called greedy normal form of [9,1,11,10]. The latter is
associated with an automatic structure, which in particular implies that the normal form of a length  braid word
can be computed in O(2) steps—see Chapter 9 of [11]. For instance, the greedy normal form is the way braids are
speciﬁed in [18].
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Permutations. There exists a natural surjective mapping of Bn to the set Sn of all permutations of n objects. This
mapping is non-injective, but there exists a canonical way of choosing for every permutation  a braid e() that projects
onto . Now, let n be Garside’s fundamental braid deﬁned by n = (1)(21) . . . (n−1n−2 . . . 21). Then, the
normal n-strand braid words considered above happen to have the form kne(1) . . . e(), where k is an integer, and
(1, . . . , ) is a sequence a permutations in Sn. Hence we can encode a normal n-strand braid word by the associated
sequence (k, 1, . . . , ), with k an integer and 1, . . . ,  permutations in Sn. Conversely, we can associate to every
sequence (k, 1, . . . , ) as above the braid word kne(1) . . . e(), thus deﬁning a unique braid, and, if this word is
normal, we naturally say that the sequence (k, 1, . . . , ) is normal. The point is that there exists an efﬁcient algorithm
[11] which, starting with an arbitrary sequence (k, 1, . . . , ), computes the unique normal sequence (k′, ′1, . . . , ′′)
representing the braid kne(1) . . . e(), and, therefore, sequences of permutations also provide a good solution for
working with braids.In the sequel, if the braid b is represented by the normal sequence (k, 1, . . . , )—or, equivalently,
by the normal word kne(1) . . . e()—the number k will be called the inﬁmum length of b, and denoted by inf(b),
and the number k +  will be called the supremum length of b, denoted by sup(b).
Let us observe that, even if representing braids using sequences of permutations is essentially equivalent to repre-
senting them using normal words, going from one representation to the other may have a noticeable algorithmical cost.
Even measuring the length of the data can give different values: for instance, the braid b = 1 in Bn is represented by
the length  normal word 1 . . . 1, and by the product of  permutations (2 1 3 . . . n), while b′ = n is represented by
the above word of length n(n − 1)/2, and by the unique permutation (n n − 1 . . . 2 1): the speciﬁers of b and b′ have
respectively length  and n(n − 1)/2 in one case, while they have lengths n and n in the other.
4.2. A framework for secure implementations of Scheme II and III
Let us come back to the braid schemes of Section 3. The implementation of Scheme I does not alter its security
properties, so we will focus on the other two schemes, and more speciﬁcally on Scheme II. The general framework is as
follows. We use some ﬁnite alphabetA (consisting of the letters ±1i , or of permutations plus one integer, or possibly
of other symbols), in which we draw words with some upper bound on their length . Thus, usingA for the set of
all words overA of length at most , the ﬁnite set of braids we consider is the set Bn of all braids in Bn that can be
speciﬁed (in at least one way) by a word inA, i.e.,
Bn = {[w];w ∈A},
where [w] denotes the braid represented by w. We use Bn for {[w];w ∈A}.
The probability distribution we consider is supposed to be uniform onA, so, as was said above, it does not achieve
the right invariance condition required for Proposition 3.3, and there is a problem for designing a probabilistic Turing
machine simulating the exchanges in Scheme II in the case ε = 1. A priori, two problems could arise when length is
ﬁxed, namely not being able to recreate all instances of the communication between A and B, or being able to create
them but with a distinguishable probability distribution only. Let us observe that the ﬁrst problem does not occur: for
any prover A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine M, which is able to recreate B’s view of
the communication in Step 2(iii). Indeed, we can consider the Turing machine which generates instances of the form
(rbr−1, 0, r) and (rr ′−1b′r ′r−1, 1, rr ′−1), where r is chosen the way it is by A, and r ′ is a random braid chosen with
the same length as the private key s. As a new r ′ is chosen for each instance, this ensures that every instance of the
communication between A and B can be recreated.
4.3. Scheme II′
So, the problem lies in the probability distributions of the instances of the form (x, 1, y): indeed, the distribution
of the braids rs−1 with r in Bn can be in general distinguished from that of random braids rr ′
−1
considered above.
Moreover, the effective distribution of braids x = rbr−1 can also be distinguished from that of braids rr ′−1b′r ′r−1. To
get rid of the problem, we consider a variant of Scheme II, called Scheme II′. We show that Scheme II′ is, in fact, as
secure as Scheme II itself, and that it suits proper zero-knowledge properties.
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Let us assume here that braids are speciﬁed using normal sequences of permutations. So A denotes the set of all
permutations of n objects, and Alice is supposed to choose random words uniformly inA. We deﬁne Scheme II′ by
introducing the following changes in Scheme II:
• the private key s satisﬁes inf(s) = 0, i.e., there is no n in the normal word expansion of s, and sup(s) = ; these
values are public, and so is the exponent sum e(s).
• the public key b′ is chosen in Bn, and b is deduced using b = s−1b′s.
The differences with Scheme II are that, in Scheme II, the private key s is chosen in Bn , so that we have sup(s)
only, and the public key b is chosen ﬁrst, thus being simpler (in some sense) than b′, which is deduced by conjugacy.
Proposition 4.1. Retrieving the secret key s from the public key (b, b′) is of equivalent difﬁculty in Scheme II′ and
Scheme II.
Proof. It is obvious that the ability to retrieve s in Scheme II yields the same ability in Scheme II′, so we are left with
the question of proving that, conversely, Scheme II′ is not signiﬁcantly easier than Scheme II.
Firstly, notice that restricting to private keys s with the property that n does not occur in the normal form of s does
not modify the security of the scheme, because, for each integer k, the braids s and kns are equivalent from the point of
view of conjugacy: the braid 2n belongs to the center of Bn, so, if k is even, b′ = (kns)b(kns)−1 is merely equivalent to
b′ = sbs−1; if k is odd, b′ = (kns)b(kns)−1 is equivalent to n(b′) = sbs−1, where n denotes the ﬂip automorphism
of Bn that exchanges i and n−i for every i, and, in all cases, solving Conjugacy Search Problem for (b, b′) and for
(b,n(b
′)) has the same complexity.
The second requirement, namely that b is chosen after b′, does not change the security, as, in any case, we demand the
relation b′ = sbs−1. Here is the point of the argument. When we are given a normal sequence (k, 1, . . . , −1), there
are at least (n−1)/2 permutations  such that (k, 1, . . . , −1, ) is normal. This implies #Bn(n−1)/2#B−1n
for every , and, therefore, the number of private keys of a given length  is equivalent to the number of private keys
of length . We can reasonably assume the security of the scheme grows with the number of private keys of a given
length. We deduce that solving Scheme II′ for private keys of supremum length  is not easier than solving it for all
keys of supremum length , hence not easier than solving Scheme II with the same parameter . 
(In practical implementations, the parameter  is given relatively small values, typically 20, so another argument
showing that Scheme II′ is not easier than Scheme II is that we can solve Scheme II for  by systematically solving
Scheme II′ for ′.)
By construction, Scheme II′ has the same ideal zero-knowledge properties as Scheme II, and, in particular, Proposition
3.3 still holds. We now give a statistical argument based on a length analysis supporting the claim that, for Scheme
II′ the distinguishability introduced by the restriction to a ﬁnite set of braids provides no useful information.
Proposition 4.2. For every prover A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine, which recreates for
each B its view of the communication between A and B with a probability distribution that is indistinguishable through
statistical length analysis of the data.
Proof. Let us consider the Turing machine M used in the proof of Proposition 3.3. We construct a new Turing machine
M ′, modifying M as follows: before starting communication, M ′ draws a random braid s′, with sup(s)′ = sup(s)
and e(s′) = e(s) (those numbers are public). Note that such a drawing can be made in polynomial time. Then, M ′
randomly selects a bit ε and a braid r (step 1). For ε = 0, M ′ computes the triple (rbr−1, 0, r); for ε = 1, M ′ computes
(rs′−1b′s′r−1, 1, rs′−1) (step 2), always choosing r in the way A does, i.e., it simulates A’s answers but using the
random key s′ with the same length parameters as s. Then M ′ performs the same steps 3 and 4 as M.
We already observed that there is no problem with the distribution of the triples (x, 0, y). For the triples (x, 1, y), the
instances produced by M ′ are indistinguishable from the original instances (rbr−1, 1, rs−1) generated by A, according
to the statistical results we obtained by implementing the normal form as described in [6]. For n sufﬁciently large
(n30), the inﬁmum and supremum lengths behave like additive lengths. Moreover we observed, for every random
braid r , the following relation: inf(r−1)=− sup r and sup(r−1)=− inf r . So we have, for an overwhelming proportion
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Table 1
Supremum length of rbr−1 and rs−1 when r, b, s are random positive (i.e., satisfying inf r = inf s = inf b = 0) braids not containing n of
given sup (samples of 10,000 braids)
n sup(r) = sup(s) sup(b) sup(rbr−1)/awaited value sup(rs−1)/awaited value
15 5 10 14.83/15 4.94/5
15 30 60 88.65/90 29.4/30
20 10 20 29.98/30 9.99/10
20 40 80 119.93/120 39.98/40
30 10 20 30.00/30 10.00/10
30 40 80 120.00/120 40.00/40
50 15 30 45.00/45 15.00/15
50 50 100 150.00/150 50.00/50
100 20 40 60.00/60 20.00/20
100 50 100 150.00/150 50.00/50
200 30 60 90.00/90 30.00/30
200 100 200 300.00/300 100.00/100
of pairs of braids (r, a), inf(ra) = inf r + inf a and sup(ra) = sup r + sup a, and similar relations for conjugacy (see
Table 1). Then, straightforward computation shows that the braids effectively transmitted by A, and those generated by
the Turing machine, have the same inﬁmum and supremum lengths and exponent sum, so they are indistinguishable
by statistical means. Moreover, the same computation shows that the probability distributions for the x’s in the triples
(x, ε, y) generated by M ′ in the cases ε = 0 and 1 are indistinguishable.
The results are the same when braids are speciﬁed using normal words, because the random braid s′ and the private
key s have the same exponent sum, and, as there is no n in their normal expansion, they are represented by positive
words of the same length.
Moreover, in any case, relative comparison of several instances of the form (yb′y−1, 1, y) does not yield anything,
as the distribution of y is simply translated from the distribution of random braids. 
Table 1 shows, for different values of the braid index n, the average supremum length of the braids rs−1 and rbr−1,
where r , s and b are braids with inﬁmum length 0. For n=30 and above, we observe that the supremum length behaves
just like an additive length—to which corresponds the rows labelled “awaited value”—, as claimed in the proof of
Proposition 4.2. Similar results hold regarding the inﬁmum length.
Finally, the fact that the set Bn is huge (namely, we have #Bn (n − 1/2!), see [18]), ensures us that the
probability that Alice chooses two braids which are close is negligible. So, the accumulation of instances of the effective
communication between A and B does not enable one to deduce useful information about the private key.
Besides the previous theoretical result, the following practical observations show that Scheme II remains secure
even in the ﬁnite case, despite the fact that they are not strictly zero-knowledge (in the sense of [12]). As was already
observed, the instances (x, 0, y) can be perfectly simulated by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine, so
they do not give any clue on the private key. Now, in the case of Scheme II, the instances (x, 1, y) have the form
(rbr−1, 1, rs−1). The only way to gain information about s from rs−1 is to ﬁrst gain information about r . Now, as the
Conjugacy Search Problem for b is assumed to be difﬁcult, it is impossible to obtain any information about r (and, of
course, about s) from rbr−1.
We thus have discussed the security for an implementation of Scheme II when braids are speciﬁed using sequences
of permutations, or, equivalently, of normal words. Let us mention that similar security results can be obtained when
braids are speciﬁed using non-unique braid words, which will be introduced thereafter. Finally, as could be expected,
analogous results hold when Scheme II is replaced with Scheme III.
4.4. Choice of the parameters
When braids are represented using a normal form, the choice of the public and private keys ensuring security of
the schemes depends only on the bounds making the Conjugacy Search Problem the Difﬁe–Hellman-Like Conjugacy
Problem and the Root Problem difﬁcult. From the considerations in [18], it arises that, when braids are speciﬁed using
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sequences of permutations, parameters ensuring sufﬁcient security and efﬁciency are n = 30 (n = 60 in the case of
Scheme I) and products of 15 random permutations. For such values, the operators are specially efﬁcient. In particular,
computing the product, which determines the complexity of the process, is very fast [11], and computing the inverse
can be done in linear time, so it does not increase the complexity. This representation gives a very efﬁcient framework.
When braids are represented using greedy normal braid words, for the same values of n, choosing braid words of
length at least 1000 guarantees at least the same level of security as the values given for products of permutations.
5. Implementations using braid reduction
We describe now implementations of a completely new type, namely implementations based on a braid algorithm
called handle reduction. Such implementations are more ﬂexible, but require speciﬁcations to ensure a good level of
security.
5.1. Non-unique speciﬁers
The implementations of Section 4 involve unique expressions of the braids: in each case, a braid is encoded into a
unique object, and, eventually, it is speciﬁed by a unique word over some alphabet, whose letters may be i’s (in the
case of the greedy normal form), or permutations (as in 4.1), or still other symbols (as in the case of curve diagrams in
[13]).
At least in some cases, this uniqueness is not needed. The point is as follows: all algorithms using braids involve
the group structure of Bn, i.e., they appeal to the product and inverse operations. When we use normal words, or any
alternative representation, computing the product of two braids is not trivial, but checking the equality of two braids is.
Indeed, if two braids b, b′ are speciﬁed by normal words w,w′, respectively, then specifying the product bb′ requires
computing the normal form of the word ww′, which has a noticeable algorithmical cost, while checking the possible
equality b = b′ is just checking that the words w and w′ are equal, since the normal form is unique by hypothesis.
Assume now that we use arbitrary braid words. Then, assuming that w is one of the speciﬁers of b and w′ is one
of the speciﬁers of b′, we directly obtain a speciﬁer of the braid bb′, namely the concatenated word ww′: here the
product operation (and, similarly, the inverse operation) has a negligible cost. Now, deciding the equality b=b′ requires
deciding the equivalence w ≡ w′, i.e., we have to solve the so-called word problem of the considered presentation of
Bn. Provided efﬁcient solutions to the latter problem are known—and this is the case—it can be algorithmically more
efﬁcient to appeal to the latter approach.
Using unique or non-necessarily unique braid speciﬁers may depend on the procedures we have in mind. If we wish
to encipher data in braids, then using non-unique speciﬁcations seems ill-adapted, as this could result in an ambiguity
about the enciphered data. But, if we use braids for authenticating entities—as in the schemes described here—then
using non-unique representatives may be appropriate.
5.2. Handle reduction of braids
The previous principles can be implemented by using an efﬁcient solution for the word problem of Bn that involves
no normal form, namely the handle reduction method of [7]. Handle reduction is an algorithmic procedure that takes
a braid word w as input and returns an equivalent braid word red(w). From an algorithmic point of view, reducing a
braid word is (much) simpler than computing its greedy normal form, but, on the other hand, reduction does not yield
a normal form, as w ≡ w′ does not imply red(w)= red(w′) in general. We refer to Appendix A for a description of the
method. For our current purpose, the point is the following direct consequence of Proposition A.1:
Proposition 5.1. Let w,w′ be braid words. Then w and w′ are equivalent if and only if the braid word w−1w′ reduces
to the empty word.
LetA denote here the alphabet {±11 , . . . , ±1n−1}, and letBn denote the set of all n-strand braid words, i.e., the set of
all words overA. As previously, for w inBn, we denote by [w] the braid represented by w. Let us consider Scheme II.
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The data used by Alice and Bob are now braid words, and equality is replaced by equivalence everywhere. So, Phase
1 becomes
• Phase 1. Key generation:
◦ (i) Choose a public braid word b.
◦ (ii) A(lice) chooses a secret braid word s, her private key; she publishes b′ ≡ sbs−1; the pair of braid words
(b, b′) is the public key.
Here something is missing, namely the way the public key b′ is chosen. Should we use unique braid speciﬁers, then, by
deﬁnition, there would be one possible choice for b′ only. Now we use arbitrary braid words, so we must explain how
to choose b′ among the various braid words equivalent to sbs−1. This means that we have to choose some function S
of Bn to itself mapping every braid word to an equivalent braid word. This function S will be called the scrambling
function here, as the security of the exchanges will rely on the impossibility of recovering the word w from the word
S(w). So, our implementation of Scheme II takes the ﬁnal form
• Phase 1. Key generation:
◦ (i) Choose a public braid word b.
◦ (ii) A(lice) chooses a secret braid word s, and publishes b′ =S(sbs−1); public key is the pair of words (b, b′);
private key is the word s.
• Phase 2. Authentication phase: Repeat the following exchanges k times:
◦ (i) A chooses a random braid word r , and sends x = S(rbr−1) to B(ob).
◦ (ii) B sends a random bit  to A.
◦ (iii) For = 0, A sends y = r to B, and B checks that x−1yby−1 reduces to ε.
◦ (iii′) For = 1, A sends y = S(rs−1), and B checks that x−1yb′y−1 reduces to ε.
5.3. Choice of a scrambling function
Deﬁning the scrambling function S to be, say, the identity function on Bn is impossible: if the words b and sbs−1
are public, then the word s can be read directly as the unique preﬁx of sbs−1 of the convenient length. We have seen
that the security of the schemes described in Section 3 relies on requirements about the involved braid problems. When
adapted to the current context, these requirements become:
Recovering the braid [s] from the words b and S(sbs−1) must be infeasible. (5.1)
Recovering the braid [s] from the word S(s2) must be infeasible. (5.2)
A ﬁrst, natural solution is to deﬁne the scrambling function S to be a unique, distinguished braid representative, for
instance
• Deﬁne S(w) to be the normal form of w.
For such a choice, (5.1) and (5.2) are merely equivalent to their braid counterparts, and the security of our schemes is
guaranteed for typical values of the parameters similar to those considered in [18] and mentioned above.
We argued that the advantage of using arbitrary braid words and handle reduction is to avoid computing normal
forms, so using normal form for the scrambling process may appear paradoxical. Let us observe that such a choice
could be relevant, especially in the case of the non-symmetric Schemes II and III. Here Alice (the prover) would have
to compute normal forms—which we said has a non-negligible computation cost—but Bob (the veriﬁer) only has to
check braid equivalences, what he can easily do using braid word reduction, which, in particular, requires very little
memory.
A second, different, solution is to construct a scrambling function using handle reduction. What makes Requirement
(5.1) more difﬁcult than its braid counterpart is that the word S(sbs−1) may contain information about the preﬁxes
of sbs−1, so in particular about s or its equivalence class [s]. Now assume that we can deﬁne S so that the following
condition holds:
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No proper preﬁx of S(w) is equivalent to a (proper) preﬁx of w. (5.3)
Then the only piece of information we can extract from, say, the words b and S(sbs−1) is the braid [b] and the braid
[sbs−1], and we are back to Conjugacy Search Problem for ﬁnding [s]. The argument is similar for S(s2), so we can
consider that, if a function S satisfying Condition (5.3) is available, then the requirements of Section 3 are satisﬁed
under the same theoretical assumptions as above about Conjugacy Search Problem and Root Problem.
We claim that this can be (nearly) achieved using handle reduction for scrambling, namely
• Deﬁne S(w) to be red(w), i.e., the result of reducing w.
This deﬁnition makes sense, as the braid word red(w) is equivalent to w in every case. Condition (5.3) is not fulﬁlled
in general: if the initial word w is reduced, i.e., contains no handle, then red(w) is equal to w, so, in particular, w and
red(w) have many preﬁxes in common. However, we show in Appendix B how to choose the parameters so as to avoid
the problem, namely by deﬁning the public key b to be a word of the form b−11 b2, where b1 and b2 are positive braid
words (no letter −1i ) of equal length and, moreover, their classes are large with respect to some linear ordering of Bn
(see Appendix B).
We refer to Appendix D for still another possible choice of the scrambling function involving another braid algorithm
called word reversing.
5.4. Zero-knowledge property
In Section 4, we adapted Scheme II and deﬁned Scheme II′ so as to guarantee that a probabilistic Turing machine can
generate instances that are indistinguishable from those used in the communication between Alice and Bob. Scheme
II′ is still relevant when non-unique speciﬁers are used, and the result about the indistinguishability of the braids is still
valid. However, in the current case, we have to distinguish between the words that are exchanged, and the braids they
represent, and check indistinguishability for words, and not only for braids. Now, as the scrambling function is public,
it sufﬁces that we deﬁne our Turing machine so that it applies this function whenever Alice does. Then it just remains
to check that the exchanged reduced (or scrambled) words are indistinguishable in terms of length and of common
subwords. The ﬁrst point follows from the fact that the braid word s′ used in the proof of Proposition 4.2 has the same
length as the private key s; the second point is true provided the private key is chosen as explained in Appendix B. Thus,
Scheme II′ satisﬁes the same zero-knowledge properties in the framework of non-unique speciﬁers as in a framework
of normal forms.
5.5. Normal form vs. reduction
The implementations we have proposed consist in really different approaches. We wish to put some emphasis on
the use of braid word reduction here, as implementations of the braid group background have already appeared in
the literature, and they are immediately suitable for our schemes. Anyway, comparing these different implementations
directly is not easy, as the associated notions of a random braid are not the same. When we think of using braid
reduction, it is advisable to restrict ourselves to relatively short braid words representing braids with a long normal
form (or, equivalently, a long product of permutations). For instance, we can consider those braid words such that, after
an occurrence of ±1i , the next letter is 
±1
i−1, 
±1
i , or 
±1
i+1; we can also randomly increase the number of squares in a
braid word by replacing letters i with 2i , which dramatically increases the length of the normal form, whereas the
overall cost of reduction almost remains the same. Let us observe that attacks like the one considered in [17] demand
the use of braids with long greedy normal forms: using special braid words of the type considered above together with
handle reduction is then an efﬁcient solution.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed the ﬁrst authentication schemes specially designed for braid groups. The ﬁrst of
them is a two-pass protocol relying on a speciﬁc version of the conjugacy search problem, while the two other ones
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are iterated three-pass protocols based on the Conjugacy Search Problem and/or Root Problem. We have discussed
the security of these schemes and given evidence that none of them leaked any useful information on the secret key,
even though traditional zero-knowledge models cannot apply to the braid groups, which are inﬁnite. Finally, we have
addressed in a detailed manner the issue of implementing these protocols, and more particularly have pointed out
the relevance of the so-called handle reduction, which allows to efﬁciently verify the equivalence of two braid words,
without requiring to compute a normal form of any of them, thus being particularly relevant for authentication schemes.
Appendix A. Handle reduction
Handle reduction is an algorithmic procedure that takes a braid word w as input and returns another equivalent
braid word red(w) with the property that w represents the trivial braid if and only if the word red(w) is empty. From
an algorithmic point of view, reducing a braid word is (much) simpler than computing its greedy normal form. The
counterpart to this efﬁciency is that reduced braid words do not yield a normal form: there exist equivalent braid words
w,w′ such that the words red(w) and red(w′) are not equal.
Handle reduction is a direct generalization of the usual free reduction process consisting in iteratively deleting the
patterns xx−1 or x−1x in a word. Let us say that w freely reduces to w′ if w′ is obtained from w by iteratively deleting
subwords i−1i or 
−1
i i . Because every braid word i
−1
i or 
−1
i i is equivalent to the empty word, w being freely
reducible to w′ implies w ≡ w′. In particular, if w is freely reducible to the empty word, then w ≡ ε holds. The
converse implication is not true, because the braid groups are not free: for instance, we have 13−11 
−1
3 ≡ ε, but the
word 13−11 
−1
3 cannot be freely reduced to ε.
Deﬁnition. A i-handle is deﬁned to be a braid word of the form ei v
−e
i where e is ±1 and v is a braid word that
contains no letter k with k i and, moreover, either i+1 or −1i+1 does not occur in v.
We see that a braid word of the type i−1i or 
−1
i i is a special case of handle. More generally, a handle corresponds
under the standard geometrical interpretation of braids to the following geometrical pattern, which explains the name:
Deﬁnition. Assume that u is a i-handle, say u = ei v−ei . We deﬁne red(u) to be the braid word obtained from v by
replacing each letter ±1i+1 with 
−e
i+1
±1
i 
e
i+1, and keeping the other letters unchanged. If w, w′ are braid words, we say
that w′ is obtained from w by handle reduction if we can transform w into w′ by iteratively replacing some handles u
with the corresponding words red(u).
It is clear that handle reduction generalizes free reduction, and that reducing a braid word yields an equivalent braid
word, as the ﬁgure below shows:
On the other hand, it is not clear that braid word reduction has to terminate, as the length of the words may increase
during reduction. The following result is proved in [7]:
Proposition A.1. Let w be a braid word of length . Then w is equivalent to the empty word ε if and only if w reduces
to ε if and only if every sequence of reductions starting from w ﬁnishes with ε. Moreover, every sequence of reductions
starting from w terminates in exponential time at most.
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Table 2
Statistics for handle reduction: average CPU time in milliseconds and (bracketed) average number of reduction steps in terms of the braid index
n and the length  of the words
n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
 = 64 0.061 (7) 0.026 (2.1) 0.023 (0.7) 0.018 (0.3)
 = 256 0.85 (88) 0.35 (22) 0.18 (6.4) 0.07 (2.1)
 = 1024 28 (1974) 7 (385) 2.5 (81) 1.3 (21)
 = 4096 1333 (35,966) 621 (18,617) 88 (2188) 24 (358)
 = 16, 384 44,784 (381,938) 69,773 (627,177) 11,401 (116,900) 1404 (15,520)
Thus, braid word reduction always detects triviality: a braid word is trivial, i.e., equivalent to the empty word, if and
only if it reduces to the empty word. Several reduction strategies have been proposed; as one can expect, those based
on a divide-and-conquer principle are more efﬁcient in practice. In the sequel, we assume that such a strategy is ﬁxed,
and we denote by red(w) the unique reduced word obtained from w. The complexity upper bound stated in Theorem
6 seems to be far from optimal: we have no example of a worst case complexity higher than 2, and the average case
complexity seems to grow approximately as 1.5, at least for 5000: see Table 2 for some statistics on the number of
reduction steps and the average time needed to reduce a random braid in terms of the braid index (i.e., the size of the
alphabet) and the number of crossings (i.e., the length of the words).
Appendix B. Avoiding common preﬁxes in handle reduction
The braid groups Bn are equipped with a linear ordering < compatible with multiplication on the left and admitting
the following characterization [8]: [w]> 1 holds if and only if the word red(w) contains 1 (in which case it cannot
contain −11 ), or no ±11 and 2 (in which case it cannot contain −12 ), etc. We then have the following theoretical result:
Proposition B.1. Assume that s is a random positive braid word, containing at least one 1, and [w]> [s] holds.
Then the average length of the maximum common preﬁx of red(sw−1) and s has upper bound n − 2, and no preﬁx of
red(sw−1) is equivalent but not equal to some preﬁx of s.
Proof. Let m denote the length of the longest preﬁx of s not containing 1.As we assume [s]< [w], the word red(sw−1)
does not contain1, so the longest common preﬁx of s and red(sw−1) has length at most m. Computing the average value
of m gives the ﬁrst result. Deﬁne, for each braid word u of length , the characteristic function u : {0, 1, . . . , } → Bn,
which associates to k the class of the length k preﬁx of u in Bn. Then, for k >m, we have s(k)> red(sw−1)(k′) for every
k′, since the braid s(k) has an expression where 1 occurs, while red(sw−1)(k′) does not, for, otherwise, red(sw−1)
should also contain 1, contradicting the hypothesis [w]> [s]. This proves that no preﬁx of the word red(sw−1),
excepted possibly one of length m at most, may be equivalent to a preﬁx of s. 
Proposition B.1 enables us to fulﬁll enough of Condition (5.3) for our purposes. What we need is to be able to
choose the braid words s and b so that s cannot be retrieved from b and red(sbs−1). We can do this as follows: we
deﬁne b as a word of the form b−11 b2, where b1 and b2 are positive braid words (no letter −1i ) of equal length and,
moreover, their classes are large in (Bn,<), and s is a random positive braid word. We assume that handle reduction
is implemented according to a divide-and-conquer strategy. Then consider the reduction of the word sbs−1, i.e., of
sb−11 b2s−1. By construction, it consists in separately reducing sb
−1
1 and b2s−1, and merging the results. Provided[s]< [b1] and [s]< [b2] hold, which follows from our assumption that [b1] and [b2] are large in (Bn,<), Proposition
B.1 implies that no preﬁx of s is neither equivalent to a preﬁx of red(sb−11 ) (excepting possibly the m ﬁrst preﬁxes), nor
to a preﬁx of red(sb−12 ), i.e., equivalently, no sufﬁx of s−1 is equivalent to a sufﬁx of red(b2s−1). Finally, an ordering
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argument similar to the one in the proof of Proposition B.1 shows that reducing the word red(sb−11 )red(b2s−1) cannot
re-introduce common preﬁxes with s, and our construction meets the needed requirements.
(Bn, <)
[S]
1
[SW-1]
m
S
1 W-1
N
red(SW-1)
Remark. The previous construction guarantees that one cannot retrieve the secret key s, or even the braid associated
with s or a preﬁx of s, from S(sbs−1). However, it could still happen that some subword of s appears in S(sbs−1).
It is doubtful that an attack could be based on such coincidences, as there seems to be no way for combining such
possible common subwords into useful information about s itself. However, we can get rid of such subwords, and,
more generally, require that the words b and S(b) have in common no subword of a prescribed (small) length, using
handle reduction. For instance, we can introduce an additional scrambling step by replacing b in Bn with
S0(b) = red(−11,nred(1,nb−11,n)1,n),
where 1,n is 12 . . . n−1 (in practice, it is advisable to cut b into fragments of medium length, say 100, to apply S0 to
these fragments, and concatenate the results). The word S0(b) is equivalent to −11,n1,nb−11,n1,n, i.e., to b, and statistics
show that the average value of the length of the maximal common subword between b and S0(b) is generically very
small (typically 4), as it is for random words of the same length. Hence, the words S0(sbs−1) do not resemble sbs−1
more than random words, and we can suspect S0 does not preserve any information, apart from braid word equivalence.
Appendix C. Choosing a one-way function in Scheme I
There are several ways of conceiving a one-way hash function suitable for Scheme I, depending on the choice of
the implementation.
Hashing from the braid group to natural numbers. In order to construct a hash function H from braids to sequences
of 0’s and 1’s, we have to require that equivalent speciﬁers are mapped to the same value.
When using permutations as braid speciﬁers, the most practical way of hashing consists in computing the normal
form, and then apply a collision-free hash function from the set of normal forms to the set of natural numbers.
When it comes to other speciﬁers, computing a normal form is not as fast as with permutations. Then, we can replace
the normal form with some braid invariant that is faithful enough. For example, from a braid word, we compute the
Burau matrix (which is a matrix with polynomial coefﬁcients) representing a braid, and then we use a collision-free
hash function over the matrices with polynomial coefﬁcients. As long as the unfaithfulness of the invariant remains
negligible (and it should strongly do in the case of the Burau representation), the completeness and soundness of
Scheme I are preserved, and computing H should be faster than computing a normal form.
Hashing from the braid group to the braid group. Another possibility is to consider a hash function H from Bn to Bn
itself. Indeed, let us set H(z)= zbz−1, where b is the public key of Scheme I. Then, Bob’s veriﬁcation step of Scheme
I, namely H(sxs−1) = H(rb′r−1), becomes (sxs−1)b(sxs−1)−1 = (rb′r−1)b(rb′r−1)−1.
The completeness and soundness of the scheme still hold, as they rely on the Conjugacy Search Problem.
Let us now consider the question of whether it is possible to generate x in order to be able to recover s from
(x, b, sbs−1, (sxs−1)b(sxs−1)−1). The only information gained on s that depends on x is the braid (sxs−1)b(sxs−1)−1,
which can be called a double conjugate of b relative to x. So this attack amounts to solving the following
Double Conjugacy Search Problem. Assuming that the braid y is a double conjugate of b with respect to x, ﬁnd a
witness s, i.e., ﬁnd s verifying y = (sxs−1)b(sxs−1)−1.
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To our knowledge, there is no method to solve this problem other than solving the Conjugacy Search Problem for b
and then for x, so, in the state of the art, it is as difﬁcult as the Conjugacy Search Problem for b and x.
Appendix D. Scrambling using random word reversing
We have described in Section 5.2 various strategies for obfuscating braid words by using normal forms or handle
reduction. It turns out that handle reduction is not an atomic process in that each elementary step of handle reduction can
be decomposed into several steps of a more basic transformation called word reversing [7]. A possibility for deﬁning
scrambling functions is to appeal to word reversing directly.
Deﬁnition. Assume that w is a braid word in Bn. We say that w is reversible to w′ if w′ can be obtained from w by
iteratively applying any of the following transformations:
• (i) Replacing some subword ij with ji (case |i − j |2), or some subword iji with jij (case
|i − j | = 1).
• (ii) Replacing some subword−1i −1j with−1j −1i (case |i−j |2), or some subword−1i −1j −1i with−1j −1i −1j
(case |i − j | = 1).
• (iii) Replacing some subword −1i j with j−1i (case |i − j |2), or some subword −1i j with ji−1j −1i
(case |i − j | = 1).
• (iv) Replacing some subword i−1j with −1j i (case |i − j |2), or some subword i−1j with −1j −1i ji
(case |i − j | = 1).
• (v) Deleting some subword i−1i or −1i i .
Each of the above elementary transformations replaces a braid word with an equivalent braid word, and reduction is
a special case of reversing. Observe that we do not allow to introduce any new factor i−1i or 
−1
i i , which implies
that reversing is not a symmetric process: for instance, the empty word reverses to itself only. Handle reduction turns
out to be a special case of word reversing: if w can be transformed into w′ using handle reduction, then w can be
transformed into w′ using word reversing.
We then propose to deﬁne an alternative scrambling function as follows:
• Construct S′(w) from w by applying word reversing randomly until the Hamming distance between w and S′(w)
reaches some prescribed (large) value.
The advantage of using S′ is that it modiﬁes the braid words quickly and easily. The disadvantage is that it is a
probabilistic process, and we can expect no secure criteria to ensure that the word S′(w) does not have a long preﬁx
equivalent to some preﬁx of w.
Remark. As the braid equivalence relation ≡ is generated by the relations of Presentation (2.1), which correspond
to transformations (i) above, together with the relations i−1i ≡ −1i i ≡ ε, we could simply think of using the
latter relations randomly. This choice would be unwise, for it would lead to introducing many trivial subwords i−1i
and −1i i , and the probability of generating the transformations (ii) for instance would be very low. The interest of
reversing lies in that it is a symmetric process and, provided we restrict to freely reduced words, it increases the length
of the words by at most a linear factor.
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